Statistics on the situation in Iraq

  • The security situation in Iraq is improving. It is possible to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time.
  • The military objectives of the surge are being met. Coalition and Iraqi forces have dealt blows to Al-Qaeda-Iraq. The overall number of security incidents in Iraq has declined in 8 of the past 12 weeks. Our operations have produced substantial progress against Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq. We have neutralized 5 media cells, detained the senior Iraqi leader of Al Qaeda-Iraq, and killed or captured nearly 100 other key leaders and some 2,500 rank-and-file fighters.
  • The number of overall civilian deaths has also declined. Civilian deaths of all categories, excluding natural causes, have declined by over 45% Iraq-wide and some 70% in Baghdad since December 2006. Iraq-wide, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by over 55%. In Baghdad, the number has come down by some 80% since December.
  • The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has declined from a high of some 175 in March, to about 90 this past month.
  • We have engaged in dialogue with insurgent groups and tribes, leading to additional elements standing up to Al Qaeda.
  • Monthly attacks in the Anbar Province have declined from 1,350 in October 2006 to a bit over 200 in August of this year. This dramatic decrease reflects the significance of the local rejection of Al Qaeda and the newfound willingness of local Anbaris to volunteer to serve in the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service.

Troop withdrawal

  • The United States will be in a position to reduce its forces in Iraq in the month ahead.
  • To ensure that we retain and build on the gains for which our troopers have fought, I have recommended a drawdown of the surge forces from Iraq. In fact, later this month, the Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed as part of the surge will depart Iraq. That unit’s departure will be followed by the withdrawal of a brigade combat team without replacement in mid-December and the further redeployment without replacement of four other brigade combat teams and the two surge Marine battalions until we reach the pre-surge level by mid July 2008.
  • I do not believe it is reasonable to have an adequate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008 until about mid-March of next year.
  • One may argue that the best way to speed the process in Iraq is to change the mission from one that emphasizes population security, counter-terrorism, and transition, to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces. Making that change now would be premature.
  • I believe Iraq’s problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions. And though we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take time.

Iran

  • Our forces have disrupted efforts of the Iranian-supported militia extremists.
  • Malign actions by Syria, and, especially, by Iran continue to fuel violence.
  • We have targeted Shia militia extremists, capturing a number of senior leaders and fighters, as well as the deputy commander of Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, the organization created to support the training, arming, funding, and, in some cases, direction of the militia extremists by the Iranian Republican Guard Corps’ Qods Force.
  • These elements have assassinated and kidnapped Iraqi governmental leaders, killed and wounded our soldiers with advanced explosive devices provided by Iran. It is increasingly apparent that Iran seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.
  • None of us earlier this year appreciated the extent of Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about which we all now have greater concern.

Read the full Report to Congress here.