Brendan Nelson has worse problems than what to do about that hair of his. He is a transitional leader and he has the next stage of the evolution of the Liberal Party, in Malcolm Turnbull, breathing down his neck.

While Turnbull was the media favourite, it is perhaps no surprise that the Liberals couldn’t bring themselves to go straight from John Howard to Turnbull, especially as Turnbull appeared to be throwing overboard (pun definitely intended) any number of Party valuables in an effort to appeal to the mainstream.

But Nelson confronts the same problem. In particular, WorkChoices is now (to push metaphors to breaking point) the Coalition version of Beazley’s Black Hole.  The speed with which they run away from that debacle will determine whether Labor can use WorkChoices to win the 2010 as well as 2007 elections.

Declaring that the policy was sound, but the politics were poor – or that, as Julie Bishop seems to suggest, AWAs are popular in Western Australia and therefore the rest of the country should like them – won’t do.

Turnbull, and Joe Hockey, understand that WorkChoices needs to be jettisoned quicksmart. However, it appears that not enough of their colleagues do. Nelson needs to find a clever solution or, perhaps, to show some leadership and force his party to follow him. He is saying he won’t decide until he sees the Government’s bill, but he doesn’t have long to work out a solution that prevents Labor from – yep, let’s say the word – wedging the Liberals.

And reports that Nick Minchin led a rump of conservative WA votes against Turnbull over the “sorry” issue suggest that WorkChoices may not be the last issue that splits progressives and Howardite dead-enders. Indeed, this has potential to lead the Liberal Party back to the 1980s, when it was wracked not merely by the Howard-Peacock feud but by outright warfare between progressives and right-wingers, particularly in Victoria. That battle was won by the Right, which was in ascendancy until 24 November 2007.

This time, the Liberal’s conservatives face both electoral rejection and Malcolm Turnbull. They’ll hope, one suspects forlornly, that Nelson can be electorally appealing while hanging on to most of the Howard legacy. They’ll also hope, equally futilely, that Turnbull’s ambition can be contained. Turnbull is smart enough to avoid both the outright treachery of the 1980s-model Howard and the supine whingeing of Costello. Like Costello, his attacks on his opponents will demonstrate what the party would get if he was leading them, but like Howard, he will seize even a half-chance to get the top job. And don’t put it past Turnbull to tack just far enough to the right to pick up the handful of votes he needs to win.

He will also be egged on by a press gallery that, as it did with Keating, recognises that Turnbull is good copy, far better than Nelson or even Rudd. Nelson’s performance will constantly be assessed against a hypothetical, and therefore error-free, Turnbull leadership, and every key decision will be made with Turnbull’s reaction in mind.

Fighting Kevin Rudd and balancing progressives and conservatives within his party will be tough enough for Nelson. But he will find himself shadow-boxing with Turnbull as well. Unless he achieves the near-miraculous feat of winning back Government in one term, Nelson – and the party’s conservatives – know that even a strong performance in 2010 won’t be enough to keep Turnbull out.