There are more horrors to tell from the murky depths of under-performing defence programs. It is pretty much understood that the Navy can only get a few of its six submarines to sea for want of crew. There are many sub-sets of sad stories for the Collins class subs, what follows is just one of the scarier — and costlier — ones.
A report done in 1999 by two fellows named McIntosh and Prescott put down recommendations on how to best fix the ill-fated Collins class submarines. Nearly 10 years and many billions of dollars later, serious questions need to be asked about these submersible money pits.
The Defence Material Organisation or DMO is the focus. The DMO is a 7000-strong bureaucracy charged with cradle to grave management of weapons systems for the Australian Defence Force. The part that the DMO played in hobbling the Navy’s sub force is significant.
Two fire-control systems were up for consideration to help fix the Collins class subs. One was an American developed AN/BYG-1 system. Australian Industry offered to incorporate the far more advanced and working TDMS system for around $1.5 million a boat.
In the end, the American kit was selected to be the primary fire-control system. One boat is equipped with the AN/BYG-1 combat system while the another is in the process of having this system fitted. The Australian developed TDMS did make it on to two of the boats as a back up system.
In comparative trials with the American AN/BYG-1 system, both in manual and automatic modes, the Australian designed and developed TDMS system worked flawlessly. The same cannot be said for the AN/BYG-1 system. At the next upgrade of the AN/BYG-1 combat system, the automatic features which have been demonstrated by Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) trials not to work, will be deactivated. The taxpayer is being asked to pay for this.
The American system came with a high price and implied threat: use the US system or get pushed out of super secret technology sharing. The price of the American system? About 250 times more than the Australian one. Costs so far are over $3 million invested in the Australian system and around $750 million invested in the American system.
As with other Defence projects, DMOs cradle-to-grave management of programs is not only expensive, but potentially risky to the men and women who have to use them. Torpedoing effective Australian home industry and poor spending of taxpayer cash makes the DMO the enemy below. It’s time the public forced its politicians to have DMO management surface and answer for their misdeeds.
Regardless of the Fire Control Systems, the Collins Class Submarines were a complete waste of Billions of Dollars of Tax Payers money. For a start, Australia does not have a Submarine requirement to support our defence. We have a very large coastline, submarines use is not for this purpose, maybe defending Sydney Harbour. Submarines not only cost many millions to build, maintenance requirements soon total billions of Dollars. Australia’s Defence would be much better served with 200 fast Missile Patrol Boats, which could be made in Australia. For the last 40 years Australia’s Submarine fleets have achieved nothing to warrant their multi Billion Dollar costs. Most of the time we have been lucky to have one submarine available for use.
*I’ll* get my dunce cap – not “I” get 😉
This story is crazy. The “back up” system for two submarines was not Australian designed and it was not as cheap as quoted. It was a US Navy designed computer fix for a similar problem on their boats. Crikey is not doing much for its already dented reputation by printing this nonsense. Add anything by Mr Palmer to the AIDS denial or crypto-zoology section.
Of course it would help if I did a bit sharper editing. I didn’t mean to include the words “fire control system” in this piece as the mentioned combat systems, as far as I know, aren’t hooked in to actual firing. Otherwise it’s all good. Still though, I get my dunce cap and sit in the corner for a while.
There seems to be more than a little confusion in this article. First, between fire control systems (FCS) and combat systems. I believe there was no Australian competitor to the AN/BYG-1 Combat system: the competition for that was a very creditable European system. Presumably the Australian FCS referred to could have been incorporated with either contender. The cost comparison between the complete AN/BYG and a FCS module is thus utterly meaningless. Eric is anyway aiming at the wrong target in this case: the DMO, whatever its failings, is not the culprit in effectively disregarding the professional advice it received and directing acquisition of a US system designed for nuclear attack submarines rather than a European one optimised for conventional boats. That distinction belongs to the Howard government and its hopeless obsession with making the navy little more than a squadron of the US Pacific Fleet (shared, it may be said, by a few senior naval persons at the time). By all means keep battering DMO, Eric – it is indeed ridiculously bloated. But it has become what it is through political sanction – and most of the lousy purchasing commitments made in favour of our great ally have the same provenance.