On Monday, Bernard Keane took me to task over my call that property prices will fall next year on the basis of the “we’re not building enough dwellings” argument, and uses ABS data comparing net immigration to total dwellings to support his case.
If immigration was the sole cause of the need for new houses, and if we housed one immigrant per house, his chart might have some significance. But we have a bit of local population growth to account for as well, and of course the ratio of people per house is a bit lower than one. So a better comparison can be made by comparing the flow of new Australians to the flow of new dwellings, and seeing how that ratio rates against the ABS data that tells us that the average home has 2.54 occupants (the relevant ABS files are ABS8752 for dwellings and ABS310101).
That comparison shows that we between 1985 and 2009, we constructed an average of 1 dwelling per 1.79 new Australians — well below the current average occupancy rate.
On that data, we weren’t building too few dwellings for the past 25 years — we were building too many. Only since the financial crisis began has the rate of construction fallen below the level needed to maintain our current population to housing ratio.
If the “house prices are all driven by population” argument were correct, then we would have had falling house prices for the last 25 years — but we haven’t of course. Instead we’ve had rising house prices, and to explain it, we need to find a related factor that has been rising.
That factor is gearing: the level of debt taken on by Australians to finance house purchases, and the ratio of borrowed money to house purchase prices. Rising leverage drove prices up in a Ponzi bubble, and falling leverage will drive them down again too.
And that bet: I have probably lost the second half of it, when my interest was always in the first. I wasn’t trying to call the peak in housing — if Rory had suggested a bet on that front, that 131 on the ABS House Price Index was the peak, I would have refused it.
Instead the bet was about how far house prices would fall from their peak, whatever that might be — in which case I said I expected a fall like Japan’s over a similar time frame: 40% over 10-15 years.
For the sake of closure however, in late last year (2008) I said that I expected prices to be falling by late 2009, and if they weren’t — if in particular they broke the September 2008 peak of 131 — then I would walk, on condition that Rory also had to don his joggers if over the long term, my primary call was proved right. The Statute of Limitations on that is 2025 — 15 years from now.
If we hadn’t had the First Home Vendors Boost (let’s call it what it is), then I very much doubt that I’d be facing a jog in the Snowy this year. But the Boost happened, it renewed the dying bubble, and I’ll probably have to walk next year. But before 2025 I expect a somewhat older Rory to also have to burn some foot leather on the Snowy track.
In 15 years nobody will care.
Adam, it would be amusing if Rudd and Swan had been reading your commentaries all along, with the result that they became self-preventing prophecies. I think it’s fairly clear that the rise and rise of speculation was neither accidental nor inevitable.
“That factor is gearing: the level of debt taken on by Australians to finance house purchases, and the ratio of borrowed money to house purchase prices. Rising leverage drove prices up in a Ponzi bubble, and falling leverage will drive them down again too. ”
At the extreme of this, see the investment models pushed hard by property gurus like Ed Chan and Tony Melvin (described in their book “How to Legally Reduce Your Tax Without Losing Your Money”). Basically you get a second mortgage against the increased value of the ones you already own. You increase your property portfolio exponentially over time. You never sell a property. Since you’re negative gearing, you get to a point where the cost-yield gap is too much for your income to cover, so you just get another low-doc loan to cover your other loans. You get more low-doc loans to fund your lifestyle. You retire and buy a yacht or whatever using low-doc loans. This has become a very popular investment model. And it results in a reduced pool of properties ever being released back onto the market.
It’s that reduction of the turnover pool, not the reduction of total dwelling numbers, that brings about the undersupply. (Why else did Melvin and Chan write the book?). An increase in total dwellings could offset it, but governments ensure that doesn’t happen.
That does sound a little bit ‘Eddy Groves’ James, and most certainly not sustainable. I agree there are people out there who have made a ‘fortune’ by borrowing big, but it’s just that – borrowings. It’s not sutainable wealth, nor is it sound from a cashflow perspective.
I doubt many banks would be interested in funding such a model right now. Maybe a few years ago when the lenders were all in the same mind.
I think the most valid point you make is the reduction in turnover. If prices start to slide people will simply take their houses off the market and hold them (unless they are facing financial ruin). They will simply stop the turnover and halt the fall in prices. Not good news for the real estate agents and conveyancors but this will provide some support and stability.
It’s a prisoners’ dilemma. The first ones to sell will make an absolute bundle, even after CGT costs, at the expense of those who hold.
Adam is right about turnover. If prices fall, those that can afford to wait to sell their place will do just that. And with mortgage default rates at 0.6%, that’s the vast majority.