So, Nick Clegg has made his choice, David Cameron is Prime Minister, and Britain heads into the unfamiliar world of coalition government. Again, Disraeli’s famous line that “England does not love coalitions” will be put to the test.
For the Liberal Democrats, coalition comes with particularly bad precedents. The past three coalition governments in Britain were during the two World Wars and the Great Depression. The First World War coalition all but destroyed the Liberal Party; the National government during the Depression was the ruin of what was left of it, and the Second World War coalition was the last time that Liberals had any participation in government.
There has been one subsequent near-government experience: in 1977 the Liberals entered into an agreement to support the then-tottering Labour government in return for certain policy concessions, but without entering the ministry. The agreement only lasted a year, and in 1979 the Liberals voted with the Tories to bring down the government: at the subsequent election they lost a quarter of their votes and fell back to 11 seats.
Britain has a deeply held self-image as a two-party system. In reality, there have often been powerful third parties: the Canningites in the late 1820s, the Peelites in the 1850s, the Irish Nationalists from the 1870s onwards and the Liberal Unionists in the 1880s and ’90s. But actual coalitions tended to be short-lived and unsuccessful — such as the Peelite-Whig government of 1852, which fell apart during the Crimean War.
The 20th century experience was no different. In 1914, the Liberals were in government; not travelling well, but unquestionably one of the two major parties. But the war was a disaster for a party based on free trade and international co-operation. The Conservatives, with no scruples about aggressive war making, soon came to dominate the wartime coalition; the Liberals split, and when the Conservatives ejected the remnant from the coalition after the war, they found the Labour Party had supplanted them as the main force on the left.
In 1924 and 1929 the Liberals supported minority Labour governments, but without getting anything in return. This display of impotence hurt them electorally, particularly since Labour was willing to suffer short-term losses in order to squeeze out the Liberals and supplant them. But the Liberals still resisted any co-operation with the Tories; as the Liberal Magazine put it in 1923:
“… there are no conceivable circumstances in which the Liberal Party could enter into a coalition, alliance, partnership, understanding, or other collusive arrangement … with the Conservative Party. Liberals are not separated from Conservatives merely by a difference in the way of doing things … They are separated in their fundamental aims, in thought, in idea, in principle …”
As the Greens in Australia risk discovering, a minor party that can only deal with one side has trouble maintaining a raison d’etre. The Liberals did ultimately link up with the Conservatives in the National government of 1931, but they soon split again before being all but wiped out in the 1935 election.
After 50 years in the wilderness, the Liberals returned to relevance in the 1980s, and now Nick Clegg has led them back to the government benches. As the only combination that could provide stable government, the agreement with the Tories makes considerable sense. But the sad history of coalition politics is bound to give him some sleepless nights.
Charles says: “The agreement only lasted a year, and in 1979 the Liberals voted with the Tories to bring down the government: at the subsequent election they lost a quarter of their votes and fell back to 11 seats.”
This seems like a likely scenario. I cannot think of any reasons why one would waste a vote on the LibDems in the future. If chaos results (probably Conservative’s Plan B) the electorate will revert more than ever to the two parties, et voila, plus la meme chose.
It is telling that all the coalitions, including this one, happen in response to crisis. A sure sign that their (and ours?) political/electoral system needs to change to embrace more diversity than two polarized dysfunctional parties. Interesting times ahead.
So I was wrong in expecting a Lab-LibDem coalition but that was because I was incredulous that Clegg would actually sacrifice the future of his party for an illusion of a tiny slice of power (remember LBJ’s assessement of the worth of the Deputy PM –VicePrez–“ain’t worth a bucket of warm spit”).
But if it was the intransigence of some Labourites and Brown’s loss of leadership, then they might be correct. They lose power but have the time to refresh and when they come back next election they will garner a huge swathe of disaffected LibDem voters. If they had agreed to PR they would not have sacrificed future governing (unlike the Cons) but most likely would have had to deal with coalitions from here on. Likewise the Cons have not sacrificed much at all and have grasped the greasy pole. It is Clegg and the LibDems who have sacrificed themselves.
The only chance the LDP have, now, is to get preferential voting into the legislation – they may pick up some seats in the next election if they can get more votes than the people whose preferences would naturally flow to them, and get up overthe Labour Party, and perhaps with the sheer number of lefter-than-Conservative parties they might take a few extra seats. The more likely alternative under such a system would be that the LDP would get knocked out, their preferences would naturally flow to Labour, and Labour could end up back in power again.
This is all assuming that the Conservatives won’t bury any move towards electoral reform in committees and negatively-worded referendum questions and so on, until such time as they call a new election and the LDP end up the way of the Australian Democrats – abandoned for selling themselves to the highest bidder at the cost of their core values.
Given the theatre over the last few days, coupled with the job ahead, and the perception of those taking it on, given the circumstances, “Nick the Geek” Clegg’s “kiss” for “Machine Gun” Cameron puts one in mind of a scene from “The Godfather”!
CVSANDERS at 2:39 pm
–Sorry but you seem to misunderstand what the outcome of an election under AV would be: even with the same percentage of the vote they received this time (highly unlikely, more likely they will suffer a wipeout next election) their number of seats would barely change. It is only PR that would have an impact. Why do you think that both Cons and Lab only offered AV as the electoral reform? I would have to say it would be better if the Cons act according to their nature and block even AV because at least then voters might retain a bit of their anger at the unreformed shambles they have. AV might lead them to believe something has changed for the better/fairer.
As far as best scenarios go for the LibDems, the only one I can think of is if the coalition functions smoothly and for long enough that at they look like they could handle governing in the future. Perhaps they might outlast the anger against their sellout but frankly it seems totally improbable. The only explanation for the actions of the senior LibDem team seems to get their grubby hands on a morsel of power and glory for even a short time.