There’s a narrative going around — my esteemed colleague Bernard Keane being perhaps its most cogent advocate — according to which Kevin Rudd paid the price for attempting some measure of economic reform, and his early demise is a grave setback to the reformist cause within Labor. Before it really takes hold, I think it’s worthwhile pointing out some problems with this story.
The first part — that Rudd was a reformer — has a funny sense of deja vu about it. It’s reminiscent of the thousand and one articles that told us John Howard was a “conviction politician”, when the only firm conviction he ever seems to have had was the conviction that he should be in power. But even Howard’s reformist credentials, laughable though they are, look robust by comparison to Rudd’s.
Rudd’s biggest problem was the size of the gap between what he promised and what he delivered. An electorate that was disillusioned with Howard’s poll-driven policies was assured that Rudd would be different: principled, evidence-driven and reform-minded. He turned out to be none of these things.
The ETS is the most notorious example, but the Henry review, which in a roundabout way gave birth to the mining tax, makes the point just as well. A leader who was committed to reform would have released the report as soon as it was available, and used it to build up public support, if only by treating some of the recommendations as ambit claims that could then be backed away from.
A leader who wasn’t interested in reform would keep it under wraps until he’d worked out a way to deal with it, by picking an apparently innocuous recommendation to plug a fiscal hole and ignore most of the rest. Guess which one Rudd did?
Fivethirtyeight.com ran an interesting analysis of Rudd’s record from an American perspective; while some bits don’t quite ring true, it captures the basic problem, even with the title: “The Virtues of Standing Fast”. Rudd’s failure had nothing to do with being a reformer; it was all about failing to deliver on reform.
The second part of the Keane narrative is more plausible, based on the undeniable fact that the power brokers of the NSW right who elevated Gillard are as little attached to principle as Rudd was. And certainly her performance so far suggests a degree of policy timidity that is the equal of Rudd’s or Howard’s.
But that’s hardly unusual or unexpected from a prime minister who has, as yet, no mandate of her own. It doesn’t really give us much guide to how Gillard will act with an election win under her belt. On that score, there are some reasons for hope.
First because the example of Rudd is there right in front of her eyes. Principles at least might work; unbounded opportunism has been tried and failed. Secondly because Gillard seems by nature more of a consensus politician. Despite the popular myth that great reformers have to be autocrats, if anything the opposite seems to be true: Rudd’s autocratic tendencies and addiction to backflips fed off each other, and the most consensus-driven of our recent prime ministers, Bob Hawke, was also our most successful reformer.
And thirdly, because Gillard’s solidly Labour background, so unlike Rudd’s, gives her an internal credibility that he lacked. It is no coincidence that the previous leader to seriously take on the unions — Simon Crean — was also the one with the strongest union connections (and Gillard, of course, was a Crean loyalist at the time). If Gillard does try to get things done, she will have more elbow room than Rudd did.
It’s no certainty; Labor could end up just following Abbott further down the anti-reformist track. But I wouldn’t count on it just yet. Reform isn’t easy, but it’s neither as hard nor as unpopular as some would have us believe.
Charles, you may strengthen your rhetorical force by downplaying Howard’s reformist credentials. Set aside the gun legislation simply because it was ad hoc, but recall his consistency on workplace relations for nearly 30 years. A pity he stuffed up finally with Work Choices but that doesn’t touch his right to be regarded as a “conviction politician” (within narrow boundaries at the end maybe; I leave that open). Apart from reforms partly neutered by the Australian Democrats about 1997 there was the Howard-Reith-Corrigan clean up of the waterfront, messy but a determinedly pursued major reform pursued qua reform.
Then there was the GST. Remembering Costello was a big part of any reform under Howard there was also the establishment of the Future Fund – modest still in size – but a principled start on dealing with the failure to establish Commonwealth public sector retirement benefits as fully funded and there were substantial reforms to private sector superannuation.
I note that the conservative’s conservative, former Treasury Secretary John Stone, was very critical of both the GST as implemented (with over compensation for those who might perceive themselves as losers) and the Future Fund. I doubt that he gives more than a B for effort to Work Choices either and probably can see more than most critics what is less than ideal about Costello’s superannuation reforms. They are nonetheless serious refiorming efforts, carried through, unlike Rudd’s, to more or less successful completion.
The very imperfect Free Trade Agreement with the US should be counted to in case anyone is adding up all the time when something which could be called reform was engaging the time of government ministers. Indeed the FTA had to be sold as reforms usually do.
Unless you think Australia is in a dreadful state which requires hyperactive government and can somehow conjure competence out of the plunge into hyperactivity I don’t think you would say “Oh, yes, but that wasn’t anything for someone with over 11 years as PM”.
It would, as an afterthought, be interesting to speculate on what might have been added to the reform agenda if it hadn’t been for 9/11, the Bali bombing, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq. And where do you fit in to all that the Howard-Brough (and now Macklin) intervention? Perhaps you hail it as the introduction to major reform of welfare benefits being supervised for all dependants of the taxpayer?
@Julius – I don’t think anyone would claim that Howard had no positive achievements in 11 years in government. My point is that I don’t believe he was a commited reformer; there was nothing he believed in so strongly that he was willing to take electoral risks for it. Certainly he believed in the GST and anti-union legislation, but he only returned to the first when he was in trouble and needed policy credibility, and even when he pushed the second thru I don’t think he realised the negative reaction it would get – certainly he backflipped very quickly when it did.
Not that I think he was worse than most politicians in those respects – it’s just that his record fell so far short of his assiduously-propagated image as a “conviction politician”.