The election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as Turkey’s first executive president marks a significant step towards Turkey becoming an autocracy, and further separates Turkey from the West as a strategic partner. Turkey has been an important member of NATO, but it is increasingly doubtful whether it would now act in concert with its alliance partners if push came to shove.
Democracy under fire?
Erdogan’s victory was the result of an electoral process that cannot be said to have been “democratic” in the substantive sense of the term. The election was not “free” as it was held under a “state of emergency” and with swathes of Erdogan’s opponents jailed on mostly questionable charges. It also failed to meet the criteria of being “fair”, with Turkey’s media either closed, tightly controlled by, or aligned with, the state.
Erdogan’s new executive powers are sweeping, giving him authority to issue decree laws and to intervene in the judiciary. He has achieved this position by welding together populist support from Turkey’s more rural and conservative Muslim constituents who have little time for democratic pluralism.
Critically, Erdogan’s victory also entrenches Turkey’s drift from Europe. Though Turkey long held an ambition to join the European Union, that desire is now tempered by continuing EU criticism of the nation’s poor human rights record.
There is a point, fast approaching, where access to Europe’s markets becomes outweighed by perceptions of attempted interference in Turkey’s domestic affairs. Turkey’s failure to meet that threshold requirement for EU membership has further receded with Erdogan entrenching his autocratic leadership.
Shifting allegiances
Erdogan’s leadership of Turkey has seen it move increasingly close to Russia and Iran, both of which Turkey had previously been at odds with. After having supported Islamist groups in Syria’s civil war, Turkey is now content with attempting to control the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) along its border, while allowing Russia and Iran to shore up the tattered remains of Syria’s Assad government.
Turkey’s incursion into northern Syria to block Kurdish autonomy placed it in direct opposition to its NATO allies, which support the YPG as the main force that defeated Islamic State in Syria. Turkey’s northern Syrian offensive was facilitated by Russia allowing Turkish war planes to cross into Russian strategic airspace.
Turkey has also been moving closer to Russia, with the purchase of air defence weapons moving closer to completion, and talks over the development of a Turkish nuclear power plant. These moves diminish Turkey’s value to NATO as providing a southern bulwark against an assertive Russia.
There have even been calls within Turkey to remove the US nuclear arsenal from Turkey’s Incirlik air base. The US might now also be considering the wisdom of leaving nuclear weapons at a site within a country that is less trusted as a strategic ally.
From Turkey’s perspective, the US continuing to provide sanctuary to exiled Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen has also damaged their friendship. Erdogan believes that his former close associate, Gulen, was responsible for an attempted coup in 2016.
It may be that Erdogan manages to balance strategic friendships with NATO as well as Russia, and even Iran. But, in doing so, Turkey will by definition no longer be firmly within the Western strategic camp. Perhaps the past six decades of relative inclusion have been a mere historical aberration.
Damien Kingsbury is professor of international politics at Deakin University.
Fun fact. Two-thirds of Turks living in Germany voted for Ergodan.
Isn’t multiculturalism just grand. See how quickly they integrate and share our beliefs in democracy and a free press.
Oh wait.
http://www.dw.com/en/turks-in-germany-praise-our-leader-after-two-thirds-vote-for-erdogan/a-44378286
Both Bobby and Kingsbury tend to miss the point.
Have a cup of (really strong) coffee with any educated Turk at any of the numerous cafés in the more modern cities and strike up a conversation on the topic of democracy. One has to be wary of doing the same in Australia but we’ll leave that detail to one side. Then do the same in Alexandria or Cairo or indeed Amman. One has slightly better “luck” in Beirut in terms of an answer approximating the western ideal but in general the population is sufficiently happy with a “strong” man who can emulate a philosopher-king. That individuals can “somehow” (1) participate in the conduct of the country and that (2) such a state of affair is desirable (in any sense) is utterly foreign
and, frankly, not deemed a desirable state of affairs or a sound system of government at all – as most in the region would see it. That is point one.
Point two is that, by any reading of Erdogan’s career, Erdogan was actually quite liberal; indeed deemed, quite some time ago, as a bit maverick. Any number of armchair theorists on Turkish politics have attempted to explain the change but nothing compelling has been written. Point three OUGHT to have dealt with the desire of Turkey to join the EU (about a decade or so ago – Blair – mid term) but no such desire, even by the inhabitants (just look at Greece – the Euro for too strong for the economy) exists now. The article could have, also, spent more time on the possibility of Turkey withdrawing from NATO.
As for the paragraphs that follow the heading “Shifting allegiances” they have a thread of truth to them but, taken on the whole, the assessment is simple-minded at best – and I don’t have the energy to make qualifications for each paragraph and in lieu I’ll recommend to (recent) books : Akdag, G. Ethnicity and Elections in Turkey and Karpat, K. The Transition to a Multi-Party System
Attaturk’s attempt at modernisation of a muslim society lasted longer than other attempts. eg Malaysia, Indonesia among others.
The idea of kinda-sorta muslim democracy is a chimera.
Just like individuality and gender equality.