Every time election season comes around, the same question crops up again and again: why can’t we just vote online? We can shop, order takeaway and request an Uber from our phones; why can’t we vote over the internet as well?
The main reason: maintaining the security and integrity of elections is actually a lot more complicated than it seems. But let’s take a closer look.
The argument against
While we can secure things like online banking to a reasonable degree, our elections are based on the principle of anonymity and this makes it far more challenging to protect them. Our online banking systems permanently record how much people spend and where, so that we can verify whether our balances are correct. But a record of each person’s vote would be extremely limiting to democracy because it would open up the door to peer pressure and coercion. This could stop people from truly expressing their democratic will.
The need to keep elections anonymous brings up some major problems: without records, how can we ensure that the final vote tally is an accurate representation of what the people want? How do we know that the result hasn’t been meddled with by a political party or a foreign power?
In paper-based voting systems, we rely on simplicity and having observers from each side at every step of the process. This has been relatively effective at preventing large-scale compromises and errors. When we use electronic and internet-based voting systems, we can’t see what’s actually going on inside the computers and servers, and the vast majority of the electorate doesn’t have the specific knowledge to understand the technical processes that underlie these systems.
Electronic and internet-based systems also open up the possibility for widespread election tampering that could slip by undetected, corrupting the entire system. This isn’t feasible in a paper-based election because it would require collusion between far too many people, which would surely be discovered.
Even the best electronic and internet voting systems introduce the slight risk of an utter disaster and the public losing faith in the validity of elections. While paper elections have their flaws, these flaws tend to be minor in comparison.
But what about current online voting?
New South Wales already has internet voting for its state elections, although the use is restricted to those with disabilities, people who live far from polling places, and those who are overseas. The NSW system is hardly a great advertisement for the online voting process, having suffered from significant technical issues ahead of the last election.
Since only a small proportion of people use the online system in its current form, it’s not a huge threat to the integrity of NSW elections. This is because hacking the system and tampering with its relatively small number of votes is unlikely to affect the overall outcome. If the system were expanded, then we would have cause for fear.
Then there’s Estonia… Though around a dozen countries around the world have introduced online voting in some form, Estonia was the first to introduce it in a permanent national context. Estonia introduced online voting in 2005 and 44% of votes in this year’s parliamentary elections were cast using the system. Isn’t this proof that it’s possible?
Well, firstly: cybersecurity experts still have significant criticisms about the system. And secondly: there are significant infrastructural and governmental differences between Estonia and Australia. To start with, Estonia has a nationwide digital identification system. Each person’s identity card includes cryptographic keys which can be used to digitally sign documents with the same legal weight as a handwritten signature. This is a fundamental part of the country’s online voting process.
Australia has a number of separate online identification systems like myGovID, Govpass and the Australia Post Digital iD, however they either lack the ability to perform digital signatures or they have not seen widespread adoption. There would need to be a significant overhaul to these systems before we could have Estonian-style elections.
The fact that we have three half-baked systems rather than one effective digital ID brings up another point…
Is Australia really up to the job?
Let’s take a quick walk down memory lane and examine some of the government’s recent IT infrastructure projects. There’s the much-derided NBN, which has been an utter failure at bringing high-speed internet to the country. Then My Health Record, which was plagued with privacy and security concerns. And let’s not forget the technical flaws which led to tens of thousands of Australians being harassed in Centrelink’s robo-debt campaign.
There is an incredible amount at stake when we vote, with other countries and interest groups constantly trying to influence the result in their favour. Considering just how critical our elections are, and our government’s past record on IT projects, do you really trust our politicians not to screw up online voting?
I have a further objection. Some models of online voting would make it impossible to vote informal by requiring that a formal electronic vote be lodged before one is deemed to have fulfilled the obligation to vote. Some may disagree, but I view the right to vote informal as fundamental in a system of compulsory voting.
I agree with you, but informal voting is not a right we technically have. The ability to vote informally is protected only by the secret ballot. (Incidentally, some regard the secret ballot as an Australian innovation.) It is not legal to vote informally. Nor is it legal to advocate an informal vote, and that is probably the bigger issue. Albert Langer unsuccessfully challenged that aspect of the law in the 70s, if my memory serves me correctly.
The constitution needs to be amended to make informal voting and its advocacy legal. Ideally, in my view, there should be an official option on all compulsory ballots which says “I do not endorse any of these candidates and I leave this decision to other voters.” I think both halves of the statement are necessary to spell out the actual effect of informal voting, whatever the motive. Voters could then of course add whatever they liked – provided the ballot was secret.
I think it is perfectly OK and desirable for the community to require that an informal vote be the result of a deliberate choice – not just an accident of laziness, inadvertence or whatever.
Nonetheless, in an imperfect world, compulsory voting with a secret ballot is sort of OK and better than the alternative. And definitely, online voting, to comply with the constitution, could have no option for an informal vote.
Another and even bigger reason I’m opposed to online is that all my life I’ve enjoyed and valued the communal ritual, even festival, that it often feels like. It has the capacity to bring us together. This feels more and more necessary.
I probably should have said the “informal right” to an informal vote. As you say, not protected by law, but undetectable under the current system, so it’s pencil and paper for me.
I’m not sure that the constitution needs to be amended if formalising the right to vote informal were deemed to be worth doing: most of our federal electoral rules (compulsion, preferential, PR) are established through legislation, but I can’t see the main parties being supportive of anything which created “a pox on both your houses” facility.
Good point – oh for a None of the Above option.
Until either of the major parties demonstrates an iota of cybersecurity/cyberhygiene and listen to the tech experts then no way should online voting be a remote possibility. Just look at the clusterfcuk that was that dreadful legislation waved through on the last day of parliament in 2018! Complete luddites!
“… trust our politicians not to screw up …”
I would go further and predict a large increase in hacking brought about by politicians. The usual suspects come to mind, although one shouldn’t name them. I would say that that the robo-debt campaign was a malevolent and cowardly attempt by a pigeon pair of unprincipled and morally bankrupt ministers to cut welfare payments to the most vulnerable in our community, probably in pursuit of career advancement, which I think they both got, didn’t they?
The bottom line? Our current system of voting does just fine. It is both reasonably secure and let’s not forget it’s an entertaining cultural foible as well. Don’t you just love gathering up all the how-to-vote leaflets so you know how NOT to vote, then handing them back on your way out?
In her book *From Secret Ballot to Democracy Sausage*, Judith Brett suggests that many of us really quite like turning up to vote in person. Australia has a fine history of introducing and establishing important aspects of democratic voting processes, such as providing ballot slips and pencils, cardboard booths that allow a secret ballot and putting the management of vote in the hands of an independent body such as the AEC. Plus turning up on a Saturday to our local schools allows us to support other community organisations.
” .. trust our politicians not to screw up online voting?” Not likely!
Yep, true about admirable Australian electoral practices and innovations. And I’m definitely one of those who still enjoys and greatly values the communal vibe of turning up on election day.
I vividly remember accompanying my parents in the 1950s, along with a stream of neighbours, on a Saturday morning before the footy. The polling station? The local primary school, of course. Redbrick with white-painted window sills and other trim.
Is it all going the way of solipsistic convenience? I hope not.
Apart from any other consideration remember the stuff up with the census when too many people tried to answer on line. I can just see the sites crashing and would-be voters effectively disenfranchised. As for trust the government – never.