The government’s failure to provide appropriate support for its own intelligence officers, and its insistence on evading scrutiny over its handling of intelligence matters, is endangering national security, as well as harming the men and women who serve our country in secret, dangerous work.
Much of the coverage of what is becoming known, rightly or not, as the “Witness J” matter has centred on a “secret trial” of the former military intelligence official and the government’s ongoing insistence on keeping details of the man’s case secret following his release from prison.
Whether the proceedings that saw the man imprisoned amounted to a secret trial is not clear, given there are claims the man consented to a suppression order (claims he denies).
What is clear is that the man was guilty of a serious breach of national security when he used an unsecure email system to complain internally about his treatment and issues around an assessment for the continuation of his security clearance. The information he communicated in that email contained identifying information that, if obtained by other parties, could have compromised national security and placed the lives of officers at risk.
The man subsequently pleaded guilty and served his time. He is now free, but stymied in trying to find employment because he is heavily restricted in what he can say about his recent life, and his previous employment.
He also argues that his employer failed to provide appropriate support for him despite his developing a mental health problem — one that he says led to his misjudgment in breaching security protocols, and which he says he warned his employer repeatedly about.
If there’s any truth to his claim, it suggests that agencies’ failure to provide appropriate support for its intelligence officers can lead to potentially significant national security damage — not to mention damaged staff.
Intelligence work is, plainly, a high-pressure, high-stakes work environment, even for officers not working outside Australia. But everyone has a right to expect their employers will keep them as safe as possible and provide support if they become unwell. Witness J’s case suggests that expectation isn’t being met by at least one intelligence agency.
Compare the case of Witness K. That has nothing to do with mental health, but everything to do with a failure of workplace conditions and support. While mistakenly described as a whistleblower, in fact K’s case began as, in effect, an unfair dismissal case against ASIS — but a case in which K had few or no options for redress.
He eventually turned to then-inspector-general of intelligence and security, Ian Carnell, who advised him that he could seek redress in a legal forum, and a lawyer approved by security agencies, Bernard Collaery. Despite following Carnell’s advice, K found himself prosecuted — and subsequent inspectors-general have refused to back up Carnell’s advice to him.
Instead of improving support for officers in intelligence workplaces — seemingly crucial from a national security perspective — the government has instead increased the pressure on its officials.
In a hysterical response to Edward Snowden’s revelations of illegal conduct by US intelligence agencies and their Five Eyes counterparts, the Abbott government began talking about “insider threats” and hastily introduced draconian laws increasing the penalties for unauthorised disclosures by intelligence officials to 10 years’ jail and lowering the threshold for criminal conduct so that mere possession or handling of secret information — as opposed to distribution — could be prosecuted.
And there remains no effective outlet for intelligence officials to reveal crime or misconduct within their agencies: the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, the only external body to which they can report corruption, is hand-picked by the government, badly under-resourced, operates in secret, and as the Witness K scandal demonstrates, can’t be relied on to properly back officials.
Nor is there any genuine independent oversight of intelligence agencies by parliament, given the ongoing refusal of the Coalition to consider giving parliament’s intelligence committee either the power to initiate its own inquiries or to oversee operational matters.
By increasing, rather than decreasing, the workplace pressure on intelligence officials and providing no outlet for workplace grievances, the government is locking in the conditions that lead to frustrated officials or former officials speaking out.
Regardless of the circumstances of “Witness J”, there may be many more letters of the alphabet to go.
Is the government abandoning its intelligence professionals? Send your thoughts to boss@crikey.com.au. Please include your full name if you would like to be considered for publication.
The cloak appears to be slipping. Perhaps it is time for a senior ASIS/ military intelligence spokesperson to reassure the citizens of Australia- whom the organisation(s) works on behalf of – that staff are properly cared for and do have access to both a complaints system and health assistance in the stressful role it undertakes.
Another thoughtful piece Bernard. You may not be aware but a colleague of ours in the past was previously an ASIS officer whose identity was outed by managers. He was of-course then unable to continue his work there and hence had to be moved to another Federal Government department. Some of the injury to him was minor; neither he nor anyone in his immediate family could ever again travel overseas. Some was severe, such as the ongoing mental illness, which incidentally was managed by the receiving department and never fully brought to account to ASIS for not properly supporting their officer.
Were there any consequences in ASIS following the disclosure? I doubt it. History maybe, but it would be interesting to compare what happens following disclosures made by higher ranking officers compared to lower ranking field officers.
What is more worrying is the compliant judiciary – secret trials are the norm in places like China – even the Russians have open trials but with concocted evidence.
So our judiciary pride themselves as being independent Ha Ha Ha!
Yes, a timely piece Bernard. The scourge of pointless secrecy cuts both ways. This piece reminds me of the old Callan TV series.
Sounds like you would have to be crazy to join any of these departments.
If I wish to read Rightist propaganda, I’ll subscribe to “The Australian”, not Crikey.
Bernard is representing himself as knowing the circumstances of the offence despite the whole process being secret, then says of the individual “If there’s any truth to his claim”. Is there any truth to Bernard’s. In a culture of secrecy, where is truth? Who is privileged to be told bits of it?
Our so-called intelligence agencies appear to be useless at their supposed purpose, but a danger to us. How can they seriously curb Chinese spying when our Misgovernment is eagerly copying so many oppressive practices? They aren’t, they don’t, and they’re not interested in doing so.
Alan Booker wrote of “intelligence” agencies forty years ago that they tend to be staffed by the mentally unbalanced. Clearly nothing has changed for the better.
Errata: Not Alan but Malcolm Booker, author of “Last Quarter”