With last weekend’s elections in Sweden and the polling for next week’s election in Italy, Europe’s at a tipping point: in just about every major EU country, post-fascist parties now dominates the right. And in most countries, that fascist-dominated right is on track for government.
Europe’s aging nation states are finding themselves more like, say, Australia — dependent on migration for growth — and on the extreme right they’ve discovered how to mine opposition for votes.
In most of the old western European nations, the post-fascist parties have jumped to lead the right through a dual strategy of inspiring more conservative traditional voters with a rah-rah nationalism while bringing older, working-class voters — usually male, usually regional — over into the conservative camp. (It was this strategy that Morrison sought to ape in the 2019 election.)
The result? In Italy, Austria and now Sweden, elections or polling show these post-fascist parties are now the dominant force on the right, first becoming partners in government and then leaders in their own right.
In other countries like Spain and the Netherlands, they are making themselves indispensable to conservative partners or dragging the traditional conservative parties to the anti-immigrant right.
It’s only in France and Germany where history seems to have encouraged the traditional centre-right to instead ally with the centre and centre-left in defence of democracy.
The extreme right-wing shares policy positioning: hostile to immigration, particularly Muslim migrants; a chest-beating “tough on crime” stance (particularly where the crime comes with a racial component); climate sceptic; Euro-sceptic; opposed to “special” rights for women or LGBTIQA+ people.
Underpinning it all is the dirty secret at the heart of ethno-nationalist populism. As Jan-Werner Müller says in What is Populism?: “Only some of the people are really the people.”
The crisis they’re exploiting has been a long time coming: it’s that moment when the post-World War I Wilsonian legacy of (more or less) homogenous nation states crashes into the 21st century’s mass movement of peoples, powered by the freedom of movement of EU citizens and the global crisis of refugees.
Now, across the 31 nations in the European Union or the Schengen visa-free travel zone (and in Australia, too), about one in 10 residents are not citizens — or voters — of the country they live in. In Europe, about half of them come from other EU countries and half from outside the EU. The proportion is higher still in western and northern Europe.
While the right hates freedom of movement, it’s been embraced by people seeking new opportunities. Since the collapse of the old-Soviet blocs, the central and eastern European countries have provided a migrant pool for the old West. Now it’s Ukraine. Soon, expect Russia.
Being “European” hasn’t placated the populists. Remember that Brexit ire about the mythical Polish plumbers?
Migration is renewing cities culturally and economically, particularly cities falling along the western side of the old fault line of the iron curtain: in Berlin about a quarter of the population are not German citizens. In Vienna, close to one-third are non-Austrian residents. It’s making those cities younger, more progressive, both less religious (Berlin, for example, is 60% non-religious) and more religiously diverse. Major European centres average about 10% Muslim.
In turn, it’s threatening to unmoor those cities from the surrounding country, leaving the regions mutteringly disapproving of the urban trends — and open to the lure of the “we can stop this” right.
Concepts of citizenship haven’t kept up — and a key demand of the populist right is to keep it that way. Most European countries have difficult residential, language and cultural tests for seekers of citizenship. In Sweden’s recent election, for example, the right bored away at the fact that a third of the country was either born overseas or have a parent who was.
It’s an easy target. Plenty of migrants can’t vote: in Sweden, that’s about 10% of the voting age population, mainly in the big urban centres of Stockholm and Malmo.
More progressive cities are looking for ways to allow non-citizen residents to vote in local elections. Right-dominated parliaments are resisting change.
The migration trends are unlikely to change anytime soon. Nor are national voting trends. We could be heading to a new status quo: right-wing national governments at war with the progressive cities that power their economies and are remaking their cultures.
This article needs a lot more historical grounding. Freedom of movement was traditionally oppposed by the labour-dominated left, as it was seen as a way (perhaps correctly) to undermine pay and conditions. One only needs to look at how Australia has been slowly turning into a guest-worker society to realise this is true. The right *loves* freedom of movement, it was under John Howard that the tripling of migration to Australia occured, kicking off the “lost decade” of stagnant wage growth and increasing causualisation of the workforce.
As far as progressiveism goes, migration might be making cities younger but it isn’t making them more progressive. This appears to be wishful thinking that confuses diversity with political orientation. The most progressive places on the planet are the relatively homegenous, developed nations like Sweden, Finland, Noway and Switzerland. Any migration from anywhere else into them makes them, by definition, less progressive and not more.
Looking at the results of the 2016 same sex marriage plebiscite shows the correlation: “blue blood” electorates like Goldstein and Higgins with the lowest proportion of foreign born voters returned yes votes in the high 70s or 80s, whereas migrant-heavy electorates like Bruce didn’t even crack 50%. People should understand that on average, Australia is a vastly more progressive place than the world in general, and therefore new arrivals are, on average, likely to be more conservative than the average Australian voter, not less.
The above should not be taken as a value judgement or an argument for or against migration. Just a plea for a bit more critical thinking and historical accuracy when discussing the issue and less wooly reasoning.
Very well said, Ian! When people come to the realisation that anti-immigration is neither about racism nor religion, but more to do with cultural difference which upsets the established norms in the receiving country, then perhaps we can have a ‘grown-up’ discussion about the pros and cons of immigration.
Every man and his dog says it is necessary for ‘growth’. Growth is a CANCER…it spreads throughout the body (politic) making society sick, then death (a failed state) rapidly follows. Unless a revolution intervenes…
Just what we all need on this planet…more wars!!
The ‘degrowth’ movement, like ‘carbon footprint’ is an old fossil fuels astro turf or PR construct masquerading as environmental, but there is no clear scientific support as it’s so general it cannot be tested; nor are there any working exemplars?
It stems from the nativist ‘steady state economy’ of Herman Daly (promoted at Club of Rome) and based on the bogus ‘limits to growth’ construct and recommends closed borders, nation states (vs. regional blocs), no trade treaties, more autarky etc. but plays into the hands of global fossil fuels, auto, finance etc. with existing footprints and can then play nations off against each other.
Precludes actual and potential competitive threats globally which have to stay behind borders while old ‘fossils’ and media dog whistle ‘globalisation’; originally described as ‘internationalisation’ by nativist Madison Grant (influenced 1920-30s policies in Germany) and something to avoid as it encourages liberal democracy…. the ‘libertarian trap’.
A big statement:
‘As far as progressiveism goes, migration might be making cities younger but it isn’t making them more progressive.’ but is there any substantive or credible support for this sentiment or opinion?
Whatever ‘progressiviseim’ is, sounds like a disease?
It’s in the paragraph immediately following the opinion.
Really interesting perspective and contribution Ian
“The most progressive places on the planet are the relatively homegenous, developed nations like Sweden”
Really?
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/12/sweden-election-far-right-make-gains-in-tightly-contested-vote.html
It seems you completely failed to read either the article or the rest of my comment.
Certainly explains why Sky After Dark was free to air when I was in country Victoria earlier this year.
ignore the billionaires ravaging your country, look over there! there’s a someone who looks different to you!
Umm can someone explain why growth per se is so important? And are there any limits? And if not how the hell can that be?
Much of the ‘lurch’ appears to be a confected long game strategy?
Several interrelated issues of demographic decline in Europe’s permanent populations, right wing parties catering to older above median age who are monocultural, less educated regional voters and backgrounded by a resurgent eugenics movement masquerading as environmental e.g. negative promotion of ‘the great replacement’ based on changing demography as a ‘hygiene’ issue.
OECD data show how working age cohorts have aged and declined with increasing numbers of retirees/pensioners vs. low fertility, leading to fewer new working age entrants; something has to give?
Research on behaviour has shown how older voters are committed to voting (vs. younger in non compulsory voting systems) and being spooked by right wing media, to hold back change and improved conditions for working age and youth.
Finally, ‘the great replacement’ was popularised by Renaud Camus who was influenced by Jean Raspail’s ‘Camp of the Saints’, published by deceased US white nationalist John ‘passive eugenics’ Tanton in his ‘journal’ The Social Contract Press.
An interview was conducted by a Melbourne academic in 1994-95 and published in the same titled ‘A Conversation With Jean Raspail (Reprint)’ Volume 15, Number 4 (Summer 2005).