Ever since Russia’s attempt to take Kyiv and install a puppet government failed in the early days of the war, a defeat for the Kremlin in Ukraine has looked increasingly likely. What’s stunning after almost a year of war, therefore, is the near-total absence of any discussion among politicians, policymakers, analysts, and journalists of the consequences of defeat for Russia. It is a dangerous lack of imagination, considering the potential for Russia’s collapse and disintegration.
In fact, the combination of a failed war abroad and a brittle, strained system at home is increasing the likelihood of some sort of implosion with every passing day. Regardless of whether this will be good or bad for the West, it’s an outcome policymakers should prepare for.
There are various scenarios for what might happen in Russia after defeat in Ukraine becomes even clearer. Most likely is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s departure from office, followed by a vicious power struggle among the extreme right-wing nationalists who want to continue the war effort and destroy the existing political hierarchy, authoritarian conservatives who have a stake in the system, and a resurgent semi-democratic movement committed to ending the war and reforming Russia.
We don’t know who will win, but we can confidently predict that the power struggle will weaken the regime and distract Russia from what remains of its war effort. In turn, a weakened regime, in conjunction with a malfunctioning economy, will invite disgruntled Russians to take to the streets, perhaps even with arms, and encourage some of the non-Russian political units comprising the Russian Federation to opt for greater self-rule; leading candidates include Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya, Dagestan, and Sakha. If Russia survives this turmoil, it’s likely to become a weak client state of China. If it does not, the map of Eurasia could look very different.
Given Russia’s vast expanse, long history of restive regions, and large non-Russian ethnicities — all a result of centuries of imperial conquest — the one scenario that deserves much more attention is a disintegration of centralised control and breakup of the federation.
There is a rich history of state collapse following wars, revolutions, system breakdowns, economic crises, and other epochal events. Napoleon’s empire collapsed after his disastrous march on Moscow and subsequent defeat at the Battle of Leipzig. In 1918, the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian empires all collapsed in military defeat. Of course, people, decisions, and policies played a role, but ultimately it was war and the attendant economic and social crises that pushed these states over the edge into political chaos and often violence.
Consider, as well, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, an outcome very few Russians wanted or even imagined when Mikhail Gorbachev took power as Soviet Communist Party leader in 1985. As late as early 1991, a majority of Soviet citizens voted in a referendum to retain their country.
True, all the republics, including Russia, declared sovereignty in 1990 and all, save Russia, declared full independence in the aftermath of the failed hard-liner coup in 1991. But the system collapsed primarily because Gorbachev decided to rejuvenate the Soviet Union by dismantling its core features, totalitarianism and central planning, thereby setting political, social, and economic forces in motion that ultimately compelled most of the republics to seek refuge from the chaos in autonomy and independence. It was perestroika — Gorbachev’s signature policy of economic and political restructuring — that unintentionally killed the Soviet Union.
If today’s Russia follows these countries’ footsteps into collapse, it will have little to do with the Russian elite’s will or Western policies. Bigger structural forces are at work.
Putin’s Russia suffers from a slew of mutually reinforcing tensions that have produced a state that is far more fragile than his braggadocio would suggest. They include military, moral, and economic defeat in the Ukraine war — but also the brittleness and ineffectiveness of Putin’s hyper-centralised political system; the collapse of his macho personality cult as he faces defeat, illness, and visible age; the gross mismanagement of Russia’s petrostate economy; the untrammeled corruption that penetrates all levels of society; and the vast ethnic and regional cleavages in the world’s last unreconstructed empire.
Even though few may want Russia’s dissolution today, it’s not too difficult to imagine a scenario where growing political, economic, and social instability will, at some point, compel Russia’s constituent units to seek safety in independence.
When Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov celebrated his birthday last week with a birthday cake showing Russia sliced into several pieces, it was, of course, an epic act of trolling. But the idea behind the image on the icing doesn’t seem all that far-fetched at all.
Under today’s conditions, it may only take a trigger to push the system toward collapse. The failed war with Ukraine, which has revealed the weakness of Putin and his state, could very well be the spark that ignites the frayed timbers of Russia’s institutions. Of course, sparks are unpredictable, and Russia could weather the current crisis and survive in its present form, whether under Putin or a successor. But even if it does, it will be severely weakened as a state, and all the structural tensions will remain. Putin may even suspect this. In his 2023 New Year’s address, he invoked the war’s potential threat to Russia’s independence — something he has not said before.
But if the spark does come, would a likely Russian collapse be destabilising and violent, perhaps including civil war? Historian Marlene Laruelle, the director of the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian studies at George Washington University, thinks so. “A collapse would generate several civil wars,” she said, as “new statelets would fight with one another over borders and economic assets.” Meanwhile, Moscow elites “would react with violence to any secessionism”.
Similarly, former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger has argued that “the dissolution of Russia or destroying its ability for strategic policy could turn its territory encompassing 11 time zones into a contested vacuum”. Russian groups might turn on each other and use violence, while outside powers could use force to expand their claims. “All these dangers would be compounded by the presence of thousands of nuclear weapons,” Kissinger wrote. The best course of action, he advised, would be to avoid rendering Russia “impotent by the war,” instead including Russia in a “peace process” whose details and enforceability remain nebulous.
Laruelle’s and Kissinger’s prophecies are worst-case scenarios that need to be taken with a huge grain of salt. History shows us that while imperial collapse is often chaotic for the countries doing the collapsing, the outcome is not always bad for their neighbours or the rest of the world. Napoleon’s demise ushered in an era of relative peace in Europe. The breakup of Austria-Hungary saw some initial fighting, including between Poles and Ukrainians, but conditions stabilised after a few years. Even the Soviet collapse was remarkably peaceful — most likely because the newly independent former Soviet republics and the newly sovereign European satellite countries all had recognised borders, functioning administrations, and their own elites ready to build states.
On the negative side of the ledger, the Ottoman Empire’s collapse led to horrific fighting between Turks and Greeks; the Russian Empire’s collapse spawned conflict from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean; and the German Empire’s fall in 1918 arguably led straight to World War II.
Which of these trajectories might apply if Russia were to collapse? No one — including Laruelle and Kissinger — knows, and the history of empires shows that both relatively peaceful transitions and violent conflagrations are possible.
Pessimists will point to the likelihood that a rump Russia would fight wars with all secessionist states. Optimists would counter that Russian forces will be degraded after their defeat in Ukraine and in no position to fight on multiple fronts.
Pessimists might argue that new, non-Russian statelets in the North Caucasus or elsewhere would end up fighting one another, while optimists would say that the non-Russians possess administrative boundaries, existing regional governments, and ample economic resources (now drained by Moscow) that would enable them to avoid conflict with their neighbours.
Optimists might say that things can’t get any worse compared to the genocidal war Russia just pursued. Pessimists would counter that they could get very much worse indeed and point to Russia’s nuclear arsenal.
The only point of agreement between pessimists and optimists is that a rump Russia would be a likely candidate for civil war, not least because of the existence of large and well-armed private armies.
The bottom line is that it’s inconsequential whether you’re an optimist or pessimist — we can only observe the unfolding drama of Russia’s likely collapse. Neither Western policies nor Putin himself can do much to stem it. That’s because Russia is already beset by deeply rooted institutional crises, much exacerbated by the man who made Russia brittle and unstable and generated the likely spark to produce its demise: Putin.
That doesn’t mean the West should just sit back as Russia degrades. It’s imperative to prepare for a possible disintegration. Laruelle’s and Kissinger’s unlikely worst-case scenarios should inform policymakers as they hope for the best, expect the worst, keep cool heads, and prepare for contingencies. They should avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, such as trying to help a clearly dying Soviet Union survive and prioritising the needs of Russia over those of its neighbours.
The countries along Russia’s border — from the Baltic states to Central Asia — will, if they manage to remain stable and form a cordon sanitaire, be key to containing whatever instability takes place within Russia. They will also be key to helping the Russian Federation’s newly independent successor states stabilise and behave with moderation.
Seen in this light, continued strong Western support for Ukraine — and eventually for a free Belarus and key countries like Kazakhstan — is the best guarantee that the aftershocks will be minimised if Putin’s empire comes to an end.
Given this comes from the USA, I would be interested in what a European Academic has to say.
Here you go (with the large grain of salt required given where it’s published): https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/russias-war-on-ukraine-a-view-from-the-czech-republic/ Certainly an interestingly different perspective to what we normally hear, IMO.
Also note that this was almost a month ago.
Moral philosopher Vlad Vexler: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4vkpy39iHfg
Excellent how he parses a question to move a discussion beyond the agitprop and fog of war; while gamer Perun for military analysis and Draitser of Counter Punch on broader geopolitical analysis including China, Central Asia, Turkey, EU and other nations bordering Russia/Ukraine.
Given the state that the US is in, I wonder who will disintegrate first?
If you judge how the state the US is in by what you see on television, the US was doing worse in the 1960’s.
It’s most capable leaders were assassinated by its own security forces, acting in the interests of its most powerful corporations. JFK, RFK, MLK.
58,000 youths were killed in an unwinnable war which was protested by tens of millions of ordinary citizens.
The president who succeeded JFK had to withdraw from re-election because he had zero chance of winning, since he’d betrayed his nation.
Then along came Richard Nixon.
And yet, the USA prospered, expanding its empire across the globe to defeat the USSR.
Perhaps, maybe, who knows? Certainly not ‘expert’ commentators like this article’s author.
The article outlines a likely set of scenarios that could play out should Russia be defeated in the Ukraine. It is a reasonable exercise to engage in – because history shows that authoritarian, non-representative regimes that start and lose wars tend to be destabilized.
Really? And what about authoritarian, representative regimes like the USA, a country NOT at war for 16 years of its history? Go check out the homeless populations in the US. I’d be more worried about how a country already in economic strife is going to be allowed by its so-called people to simply give Ukraine billions of dollars at their expense.
A point of clarification. The defeat of Napoleon did not see France collapse or splinter. Indeed, thanks to Charles Maurice Tallyrand, France actually came out of the subsequent remaking of European borders with an enlarged boundary.
It is very unlikely that Russia would!
How China will respond to any further diminution of Russian “power” will be interesting to see. That said, I doubt enough Russians have the anger or drive to drag Putin out physically.
France had an already well established fall back. If Putin falls suddenly (either by doing a runner, dropping dead, or at the hands of the mob) he has made such conspicuous and strenuous efforts to have the mechanisms of state all flow though him that there is no obvious stand out replacement. There has been no succession planning at all. And a cast of thousands who all think they might have a shot at it. Which is a recipe for chaos.
Indeed, a large cast of potential villains. That said a point I was making is that it is difficult to see any of them in a position to galvanise “a mass” to come out and storm the Kremlin.
Though: disgruntled military and/or conscripts might but suspect not enough of them anywhere near Moscow.
Only time will tell.
The current rhetoric, mostly coming from U.S. institutions, about the immanent collapse of Russia, is wishful thinking. The confrontation between the U.S and the now Russia began before the end of WW2, the U.S being more worried about the expansion of the USSR than they were about Nazi Germany. The old warriors like Kissinger are still fighting the same battle. Meanwhile the Ukrainian people are cannon fodder (how many more weapons and personnel are NATO and the U.S. going to send in order to extend the fight?). Ukraine will resemble so many other countries that have been the target of U.S foreign policy. None of this is to support Russian aggression, but rather to try and put it in context. Perhaps not attacking Kiev in the early stages was strategic, and more attached to romantic notions of Kievan Rus and the seat of Mother Russia? Otherwise, it would resemble Baghdad and Kabul now. There was a red line that NATO agreed not to cross in 2008. In 1990, the US, Britain, and France repeatedly promised the Soviet Union that they would not expand NATO “one inch eastward” after the reunification of Germany. Until 2014 Ukraine, along with Georgia, was seen as neutral. The push, since at least George W Bush, was to have Ukraine join NATO.
Faux anti-imperialism, that egregiously misses the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 ‘security assurances’ whereby Ukraine agreed to have all nuclear missiles and warheads removed (and looked after by Russia?), in return for recognition of Ukraine’s national sovereignty, but now according to Putin, Ukraine and Ukrainians do not exist?
The latter suggests a potentially bad faith negotiating partner?
Further, if one applies the null hypothesis to the above (in an abstract sense), can you prove that if NATO did not exist Putin’s Russia would not find other existential or real targets to complain about, and shared by too many in the Anglosphere, old left and right?
These targets include not just confected ‘culture wars’ but antipathy shared by Putin, US nativist/libertarian think tanks, GOP/Tories, FoxNews, fossil fuels etc. towards the EU (a la Brexit), multilateral trade agreements, financial transparency, environmental regulation (which impacts global supply chains via the ‘Brussels Effect’), then especially open society, liberal democracy, globalisation, immigration, mobility, science, educated and empowered citizens.
Bad faith negotiating partner? Room for that on both sides.
Joining NATO ostensibly means that Ukraine would no longer comply with the 1994 Budapest Accords (if you think the US won’t deploy nuclear Missiles in Ukraine you are very much mistaken). Combine that with both Germany and France confirming that the Minsk Accords were nothing more than a delaying tactic by the West and Ukraine (with no intent to comply by Ukraine in either word or deed) and there is more than enough bad faith to go around.
Ukraine is no saint that much is sure.
Twisted logic and opinions going on there to justify Putin’s invasion?
Complicated for sure, and not the neat for Ukraine against Russia propaganda we are bombarded with through all channels. I think the key element is Gazprom, gas supplies and who stands to gain from the pipeline destruction. Either way Europe and Ukraine will bear/bare the costs.
It’s not a zero sum game, if Russia does not export and has to shut down pipelines &/or accept discounted prices, it impacts their budgets and economy significantly.
There is also the issue of no significant gas storages, hence, they cannot simply shut off supply (Soviets never did), and accessing state of the art maintenance and parts.
Meanwhile EU nations already have started with new/portable LNG facilities accessing other suppliers, transitioning away from fossil fuels and prices have actually dropped.
What are you trying to say, no impact on Russia but you are happy to say an impact on Ukraine and EU citizens, misanthropic lack of empathy?
I agree Drew. Russia will/is suffering as well. Not sure what will happen in the EU, but I have read from DW and elsewhere that Germany is returning to coal (there is a strong anti-coal lobby there). LNG of course is not clean. Be worth returning to these questions in 12 months’ time.
Also suggest the acceleration away from fossil fuels to renewable sources, with public buy in of most EU citizens and states, with reduced carbon emissions e.g. less or no flying and car usage.