As Russia threatens the largest land invasion in Europe since World War II, the most consequential strategic question of the 21st century is becoming clear: how can the United States manage two revisionist, autocratic, nuclear-armed great powers (Russia and China) simultaneously? The answer, according to many politicians and defense experts, is that Washington must moderate its response to Russia in Europe to focus on the greater threat posed by China in the Indo-Pacific.
This would be a mistake.
The United States remains the world’s leading power with global interests, and it cannot afford to choose between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Instead, Washington and its allies should develop a defense strategy capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating Russia and China at the same time.
In recent weeks, Biden has sent several thousand US troops to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank — and for good reason. A major war in Ukraine could spill across international boundaries and threaten the seven NATO allies that border Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Moreover, if Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeds in Ukraine, why would he stop there?
Putin has shown a clear interest in resurrecting the former Russian Empire, and other vulnerable Eastern European countries — Poland, Romania or the Baltic states — might be next. A successful Russian incursion into a NATO ally’s territory could mean the end of the Western alliance and the credibility of US security commitments globally.
The threat posed by China is also serious. Admiral Philip Davidson, former commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, predicted China could invade Taiwan within the next six years. This is a war the United States might lose. If China succeeds in taking Taiwan, it would be well on its way to disrupting the US-led order in Asia, with an eye to doing the same globally.
Moreover, Russia and China are increasingly working together. As this month’s summit between Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping shows, Moscow and Beijing are forging a closer strategic partnership, including on military matters. These dictators could coordinate dual attacks on the US alliance structure or opportunistically seize on the distraction provided by the other’s aggression. In other words, there is a serious risk of simultaneous major-power wars in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
To address this problem, many have proposed answers that simply will not work. The Biden administration initially hoped to put relations with Russia on a “stable and predictable” footing to focus on China, but Putin had other ideas, as the world is now seeing in Ukraine. Unfortunately, Washington does not get to decide how its adversaries sequence their aggression.
Others have expressed hope that Washington can peel these powers apart or even align with Russia against China, but these are not realistic solutions.
The misguided view gaining the most recent acceptance, however, is that Washington should simply choose the Indo-Pacific over Europe. Politicians and experts argue that the United States lacks the resources to take on both Russia and China. They point to China’s power and Asia’s wealth and argue that Asia should be the priority. While Washington pivots to Asia, wealthy European countries, such as Germany, should step up to provide for NATO’s defense. Indeed, the Biden administration’s national defense strategy, which has been delayed due to the Ukraine crisis, is expected to focus on China without offering a clear solution to the two-front-war problem.
A good strategy, however, starts with clear goals, and Washington’s objectives are to maintain peace and stability in both Europe and Asia. US interests in Europe are too significant to let them be worked out solely between Putin and the United States’ European allies. Indeed, the European Union, not Asia, is the United States’ largest trade and investment partner, and this imbalance is much starker when China (which the United States seeks greater economic decoupling from) is removed from the equation.
Furthermore, China has conducted military exercises in Europe and the Middle East. Competing with China militarily means competing globally, not just in Asia. In addition, Xi is gauging US resolve, and a weak response in Ukraine might make a Chinese move on Taiwan more likely.
Moreover, the United States is not France; it is not compelled to make gut-wrenching strategic choices about its national security due to constrained resources. In short, publishing a defense strategy that can only handle one of the United States’ great-power rivals (which is what is expected from the forthcoming national defense strategy) is planning to fail.
Instead, the United States and its allies must design a defense strategy capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating both Russia and China in overlapping time frames. The pause in releasing Biden’s defense strategy provides an opportunity to go back to the drawing board and get this right.
To be sure, developing such a strategy will be challenging, but there are a number of ways to begin to square the circle.
First, Washington should increase defense spending. Contrary to those who claim that constrained resources will force tough choices, the United States can afford to outspend Russia and China at the same time. The United States possesses 24% of global GDP compared to a combined 19% in China and Russia. This year, the United States will spend US$778 billion on defense compared to only US$310 billion in Russia and China.
Moreover, the United States could go so far as to double defense spending (currently 2.8% of GDP) and still remain below its Cold War average (close to 7% of GDP). Indeed, given that this new Cold War is every bit as dangerous as the last one, a meaningful increase in defense spending, focused on the 21st century’s emerging defense technologies, is in order.
Some might argue that the days of a US economic advantage are numbered due to China’s rise, but China’s internal dysfunctions are catching up with it. Dictators like Xi prioritise political control over economic performance.
Xi is undermining China’s growth model by cracking down on the private sector and rolling back liberalising reforms, and his aggressive diplomacy is upsetting international economic relationships. As a result, Beijing’s economy is stagnating. Russia’s long-term economic outlook is even worse. In short, even if this new strategic competition becomes a two-versus-one arms race, Washington is likely to prevail.
In addition, the United States can actively lead its allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific to develop a free world defense strategy. The United States and its formal treaty allies possess nearly 60% of global GDP, and together, they can easily marshal the resources to maintain a favorable balance of military power over both China and Russia. Preexisting formal alliances like NATO in Europe and bilateral alliances in Asia can be supplemented with new arrangements, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
Allies do need, therefore, to step up and do more for their defense, but they will not do it on their own if the United States threatens to leave Europe. Instead, Washington should actively lead, moving from a model where Washington provides defense to allies to one where Washington contributes to allies’ self-defense. This should include incorporating key allies into military planning, sharing responsibilities, and devising a rational division of labor for weapons acquisition.
European allies should invest in armor and artillery while Asian allies buy naval mines, harpoon missiles and submarines. The US Army should prioritise Europe while the US Navy takes the Indo-Pacific and a larger US Air Force plays a significant role in both theaters. In addition, the United States should provide strategic capabilities like its nuclear umbrella; global conventional strike capabilities, including hypersonic missiles; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Finally, if necessary, Washington could always take a page from its Cold War playbook and rely more heavily on nuclear weapons to offset the local, conventional advantages of its rivals. The presence of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe helped deter the massive Soviet Red Army for decades. Similarly, the United States could rely on threatening nonstrategic nuclear strikes to deter and, as a last resort, thwart a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan or a Russian tank incursion into Europe.
To be sure, there are risks associated with nuclear deterrence, but nuclear weapons have played a foundational role in US defense strategy for three-quarters of a century — and will likely continue to do so for decades to come.
Deterring China and Russia at the same time will not be easy, but it is better than pretending Washington can deal with one major-power rival or the other at its convenience. Thank goodness former US president Franklin Roosevelt did not choose victory in only one theater during World War II. Biden should follow his example and plan to defend US interests in Europe and the Indo-Pacific at the same time.
Some of the assertions in this article are well made, some not so much and others are very dubious.
Then there is this: “Thank goodness former US president Franklin Roosevelt did not choose victory in only one theater during World War II.”
The USA won its war with Japan in World War II, certainly, although it might have been a different story if Japan had not already been fighting a major war in China from 1937 onwards. But victory in Europe was won by the Soviet Union. There was assistance by the other allied forces and they helped to shorten the war by supplying the USSR, opening the second front against Germany in 1944 and so on. And yet Germany still used 3/4 of its military resources fighting the Soviet Union, and to imply the USA won the war in both theatres is worse than simplistic. It is absurd.
I think it’s fair to say that had the US government focussed exclusively on the Pacific, the USSR might well have been defeated.
Not only were vast quantities of war material supplied to the USSR, but also to Britain which was able to blockade German ports with the Royal Navy, strike at German cities with its Air Force (and later provided a base for the USAF) but also tied down many German army divisions and material by threat of invasion, such as in North Africa and Italy.
I think most people would concede that US assistance was vital in keeping the British Empire engaged until it could build its forces in Europe to a point where they not only made an important (and often discounted contribution to defeating Germany but also ensured that western Europe remained free of Soviet domination.
Before someone attacks Crikey (again) for publishing articles from Foreign Policy I want to congratulate Crikey for publishing them. Many (including me) may disagree with some or all of the content – but Foreign Policy is very influential among the US and international elite. It is useful to know what arguments are being run – and whether they make any sense. In the case of this article some of it, as SSR said, is very dubious and the recommendations pretty strange. We can go to other sources for a different point of view (I also recommend John Menadue’s Pearls and Irritations).
It might be good for Crikey to publish two quite different views in the same edition. For example, a German or French take on dealing with Russia would be a nice contrast.
“For it’s Tommy this and Toomy that and kick him out, you brute, but it’s the thin Red Line of heroes when the guns begin to shoot.For it’s Tommy this and Tommy that, and Tommy, how’s your soul, but it’s the thin Red line of heroes when the drums begin to roll.”
That’s Kipling from the end of the 19th C in his most imperial and sentimental phase. He learned some hard lessons in the Great War, where he used his considerable influence to get his only son a commission as a lieutenant in the army, despite the boy’s ineligibility due to very poor eyesight. The boy was killed in action at Loos in 1915 and Kipling was never the same after. How Kipling would regard the current war-mongering is anybody’s guess.
The usual quote following is “..rough men guard us in our sleep.”
I think Crikey would better serve its readership with investigative international reports from Australia’s finest journalist, John Pilger, rather than war-mongering, nuclear war freaks from the ‘killer empire’ – killers at home, killers abroad.
If not to make an obvious point about the always good reportage (not to say value) of John Menadue’s peerless P&I, its Pilger piece on Feb 20th re Ukraine idiocy could be reprinted.
Surely this site could compensate P&I appropriately?
Or go there oneself and sling them a few bucks –
https://johnmenadueDOTcom/war-in-europe-and-the-rise-of-raw-propaganda/
Unfortunately PIlger often makes the same mistake as many ideologues of nowadays, of both the left and right, i.e. hero worshipping of authoritarian leaders who don’t like liberal democracy nor open society e.g. most EU nations?
Is it his adherence to facts that is kryptonite to your strange world view?
I have no issue with Pilger, he very generously gave a student friend an interview time many years ago, plus his work on Cambodia; still ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’?
However, his article on Russia Ukraine, like too many ageing left and/or right, uses an ideological view informed by the past but makes no mention of actual present society in Russia and Ukraine and their needs vs supporting an authoritarian leader?
For example, while Russia has moved away from democracy, liberalism, civil/open society, free speech, transparency etc. back to Czarist ‘Orthodoxy, Nationalism & Autocracy’, working age and youth in both nations prefer something like the EU with liberal democracy to live, work and study in, includes Putin’s own circle of elites?
Curious dynamic, seen in Oz too, old left and old right joined at the hip on sociocultural issues aka Howard’s strategy to nobble Labor and the centre left?
Dr Strangelove would approve of this warmongering garbage.
What drivel from a supposed foreign policy expert. The key giveaway was the start to the sentence “these dictators” – referring presumably to the leaders of China and Russia – with not a scerrick of recognition that the hero of the day, the US, might have something other than a simple and pure motive in somehow looking to the interests of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Belarus and Ukraine. This from a country with a disfuctional so-called democratic system (Trump, remember, industrial scale gerrymandering and slavery, racism etc etc) and published for an audience in Australia, with its own heroic colonial record of major indigeneous dispossession. Come on Crikey, please, a better selection of stuff on international affairs.
Yeah a strange article. But the key thing about it is that it was published in Foreign Affairs. What does that say about ‘thinking’ in the US these days? Do we only read things by people we regard as rational actors, when there is so much irrationality in policy around? Certainly agree that Crikey could use a better selection of stuff on international affairs.
Speaking of drivel – we could talk about the content of the AFR these days – supposedly the business paper of record. Just about the only decent thing covering the international scene is the Friday Review – which no-one at the AFR writes but is clearly curated towards the concerns of the Anglo countries. By the way – not criticising you – the AFR was better in your day.